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Moral Reflections on Strict Liability in Copyright 
Patrick R. Goold* 
ABSTRACT 
Accidental infringement of copyright is a pervasive and largely ignored problem.  
In the twenty-first century, it has become increasingly easy to infringe copyright 
unintentionally.  When such accidental infringement occurs, copyright law holds the 
user strictly liable.  Prior literature has questioned whether the strict liability standard 
is normatively defensible.  In particular, prior literature has asked whether the strict 
liability standard ought to be reformed for economic reasons. 
This Article examines the accidental infringement problem from a new 
perspective.  It considers whether it is fair to hold copyright users strictly liable for 
accidental infringements of copyright.  This Article argues that the strict liability 
standard is not fair because it results in copyright users being held liable for accidents 
for which they are not morally responsible.  Using the moral philosophy literature on 
responsibility, this Article explores our intuitions surrounding copyright’s liability 
standard in order to better understand why strict liability in this context seems 
“harsh” and “inequitable.”  In turn, this provides an argument for reforming 
copyright’s liability rule and adopting a negligence standard.  This Article then 
argues that, within the United States, the proposed reform to copyright’s liability rule 
should be accomplished by modifications to the existing fair use doctrine. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In May 2011, the University of Michigan undertook a large-scale project designed 
to facilitate digital access to out-of-print works from their library.1  Known as the 
“Orphan Works Project” (“OWP”), the University’s project was intended to increase 
worldwide access to orphan works—often rare or difficult to find books—and could 
have saved some of these works from obscurity.  An orphan work is defined as “an 
out-of-print work that is still in copyright, but whose copyright holder cannot be 
readily identified or located.”2  At the outset, the University recognized that it would 
be difficult to determine whether the orphan works were protected by copyright and, 
if so, who owned the rights.  To avoid this problem, the University performed a 
search for any potential copyright owners and published a list of the suspected 
ownerless works online, calling for right holders to come forth.3  If no one emerged 
and claimed copyright, the work would be made available online in digital format.  
Imagine the University’s surprise when the Authors Guild (an organization that 
advocates on behalf of authors in the United States) sued the University for copyright 
infringement.  Mired in a legal quagmire,4 the University suspended the OWP 
 
 1. Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 92 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
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indefinitely, and access to the works remains limited as a result.5  However, because 
the court held that the Authors Guild’s claims regarding infringement in connection 
with the OWP were not ripe for adjudication, the court failed to reach the merits of 
whether or not the University was liable for copyright infringement.6 
This story is a familiar one to any intellectual property (“IP”) lawyer.  Copyright 
infringement is a strict liability tort:  Liability attaches when someone infringes the 
right, regardless of how carefully the defendant tried to prevent any legal 
wrongdoing.7  The University of Michigan’s attempt to avoid copyright infringement 
was laudable, but largely irrelevant for purposes of liability.  No statute says that 
copyright liability must be imposed in this strict fashion; the rule is entirely judge-
made.  In the early twentieth century, Judge Learned Hand presided over a string of 
music copyright cases later cited favorably by the Supreme Court.8  The defendants 
in these cases argued they had not copied the copyright owner’s song intentionally, 
and thus ought to escape liability.  Judge Hand, however, had “no difficulty” in 
finding the defendants liable.9  At that time in American history, all copyrights had 
to be registered with the U.S. Copyright Office.10  Accordingly, Judge Hand had little 
sympathy for the defendants’ claims of ignorance.  He found that because of the 
copyright register, everyone was on “notice” of the work’s legal status.11  Each 
defendant, in Judge Hand’s view, had the “means of knowledge” that the work was 
copyrighted, and thus took their chances when they published their songs “without 
any inquiry.”12  Since then, Congress has eliminated the requirement that creative 
works be registered with the Copyright Office as a condition for copyright protection, 
but the rule that liability is strictly imposed has remained.13 
 
 5. Because the OWP has not made digital copies of the orphaned works available, anyone wishing 
to view the works at issue in HathiTrust must find an original print copy.  Alternatively, access to limited 
portions of the work may be available at other locations online as allowed by fair use, for example via 
snippet view.  See generally Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 6. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d at 104–05. 
 7. See, e.g., Buck v. Jewell-La Salle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 198 (1931); Shapiro, Bernstein & 
Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 308 (2d Cir. 1963); De Acosta v. Brown, 146 F.2d 408, 411 (2d Cir. 
1944). 
 8. Buck, 283 U.S. at 198 (citing Stern v. Jerome H. Remick & Co., 175 F. 282 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 
1910); Hein v. Harris, 175 F. 875 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1910), aff’d, 183 F. 107 (2d Cir. 1910); Haas v. Leo 
Feist, Inc., 234 F. 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1916)). 
 9. Stern, 175 F. at 282. 
 10. Copyright Act of 1909 § 5, repealed by Copyright Act of 1976. 
 11. Stern, 175 F. at 282. 
 12. Id.  See also Haas, 234 F. at 107 (“When, as in copyright, the law provides a form of notice, it 
imposes upon every one at his peril the duty to learn the facts conveyed by the notice.  Without some such 
rule it could not be a tort innocently to copy a copyrighted work, because it could not be said that among 
the reasonable result of the defendant’s acts was comprised an infringement.”). 
 13. See R. Anthony Reese, Innocent Infringement in U.S. Copyright Law:  A History, 30 COLUM. 
J.L. & ARTS 133, 175 (2007) (“As the copyright system evolved over the last century, all of the doctrines 
and features that mitigated the potential negative effects of liability for unknowing infringement were 
removed from the system.  The legal changes . . . resulted in copyright’s moving away from using 
constructive notice and knowledge requirements to reduce the risk of innocent infringement, and replaced 
those mechanisms with adjustments in remedies as the sole recognition of an innocent infringer’s lack of 
culpability.”). 
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In previous research, Professor Oren Bracha and I conceptualized cases like the 
Orphan Works Project as “Copyright Accidents.”14  The University of Michigan did 
not intend to infringe copyright; indeed, the library went to great lengths to prevent 
such infringement from occurring.  Nevertheless, had the University actually 
publicly distributed copies of works which were later found to be copyrighted, the 
law would hold them, and any other similarly situated users, strictly liable for their 
accidental infringement of such rights.  In our prior work, Bracha and I argued 
against the strict liability rule.  Drawing on Guido Calabresi’s famous work, The 
Costs of Accidents, we argued that holding copyright users strictly liable for 
accidental infringement is economically inefficient.15  Under a strict liability rule, 
the user has an incentive to take care to avoid such accidents, but the copyright owner 
does not.16  Consequently, while a user like the University of Michigan will likely 
try to prevent accidents (for example, by publishing a list of works to be digitized 
online and calling for copyright holders to come forward), right holders often do not 
proactively prevent accidents with equal diligence.  The result is that society must 
live with a higher rate of copyright accidents than is ideal. 
In this Article, I consider the accidents problem from a more common sense 
perspective.  In doing so, I focus less on the consequences of strict liability in 
copyright, and contemplate instead the moral side of accidental infringement.  My 
question is not whether strict liability fails to properly deter accidents or inhibits 
creativity (which it does), but more simply, whether strict liability is fair.  I make an 
argument that strict liability is not fair because it results in copyright users being held 
liable for accidents for which they are not morally responsible.  The University of 
Michigan case illustrates the point well.  In this case, the University took all the 
measures we could reasonably expect of them to avoid the infringement:  They 
performed a diligent search for legal ownership information, they made their plan 
public, and they asked relevant copyright owners to come forward.  If the copyright 
owners had only taken the relatively straightforward step of responding to that public 
call for information, the infringement could have been avoided entirely.  Yet, if the 
OWP had publicly launched and was later found to contain copyrighted works, it is 
the University that, in the eyes of the law, would have been the responsible party and 
thus subject to liability.  This result may seem peculiar, but it is hardly atypical in the 
world of copyright.  Even if we assume that the copyright system as a whole is 
broadly fair and just, the above example shows that the strict liability standard can, 
at times, produce counterintuitive results. 
Of course, claims about moral responsibility are hardly easy to establish.  
“Responsibility” is arguably an essentially contested concept.17  The goal of this 
Article is to explore our moral intuitions surrounding strict liability in the hope of 
 
 14. Oren Bracha & Patrick R. Goold, Copyright Accidents, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1025 (2016). 
 15. Id. (discussing GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970)). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Walter Bryce Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 167 
(1956).  At the very least, there are highly competing understandings of “responsibility.”  See, e.g., H.L.A. 
HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY:  ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 211–30 (2d ed. 2008) 
(providing a five-fold taxonomy of conceptions of responsibility). 
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expressing, more clearly than prior literature, why it is that strict liability strikes 
many as unfair and what, if anything, we could potentially do to remedy that 
unfairness.  I do so in four parts.  Part I picks up the story of the OWP case and 
supplements it with a range of additional cases where strict liability leads to outcomes 
that are likely to strike many as prima facie unfair.  Part II then proceeds to explore 
our intuitions in these cases.  There are many reasons why we may plausibly label 
someone as “responsible” for an accident.  For example, we may say that a defendant 
is responsible for an accident because they “caused” it, or because the defendant is, 
in some sense, “to blame” for the accident, or even because the accident was within 
the defendant’s “control.”  But, as we shall see, these reasons do not provide a strong 
basis of support for deeming the copyright user responsible in the cases identified in 
Part I.  Part III then turns to several counter-arguments.  These include the argument 
that strict liability is an “essential” feature of property law, and the argument that 
whatever unfairness exists can be resolved by more lenient remedies rather than 
changes to the underlying liability structure.  Lastly, Part IV considers reform.  The 
proposed reforms include modifications to the fair use doctrine that would facilitate 
the introduction of a negligence liability rule into copyright, which in turn would lead 
to a fairer allocation of responsibility in cases of accidental infringement.  In 
exploring our moral intuitions surrounding liability and copyright, this Article 
provides a perspective that is perhaps unusual and underrepresented in the heavily 
utilitarian world of IP literature.  But as we shall see, it is a valuable perspective when 
considering the growing problem of accidental infringement. 
I. CONSIDERING COPYRIGHT ACCIDENT CASE LAW:  INTITIAL 
MORAL INTUITIONS 
Accidents are an ever-present feature of modern life.  Frequently, we engage in 
beneficial activities which, as a byproduct, pose a risk of harm to others around us.  
Sometimes that risk materializes into a reality, and others are injured, even though 
we did not mean for that to happen.18  Copyright is no different in this regard.19  
Creativity is overwhelmingly positive for society:  Creativity is the source of great 
art and a driver of social change.  But creativity (or using creative works) is also 
risky.  In a world filled with intellectual property rights, creating a new novel, song, 
or work of art, or indeed simply using such products, always risks infringing the 
copyright of prior authors.  There are, of course, measures we can take to minimize 
that risk.  By acting with due care, searching out potential copyrights, and 
considering whether or not any elements of a prior work we wish to use in a new 
work are protected by copyright, we can reduce the probability that our actions will 
infringe any relevant copyrights.  But it is unlikely that we can prevent all accidents.  
Even when we act carefully—as the University of Michigan attempted to do when it 
published its list of orphan work candidates to allow copyright owners to come 
 
 18. STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 1 (1987) (defining “accidents” as 
“harmful outcomes that neither injurers nor victims wished to occur—although either might have affected 
the likelihood or severity of the outcomes”). 
 19. Bracha & Goold, supra note 14, at 1026. 
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forward—it is likely that some infringement of copyright will occur.  When such 
accidents do inevitably occur, current copyright doctrine holds the defendant strictly 
liable.  Yet, as this Part highlights, this leads to counterintuitive results.  The cases 
discussed below hint that something is not quite right in copyright law.  This Part 
ends with a summary of academic literature that expresses the same intuition. 
A. AUTHORS GUILD, INC. V. HATHITRUST:  THE ORPHAN WORKS PROJECT 
The Introduction has already highlighted how, in Authors Guild, Inc. v. 
HathiTrust, there is an intuitive sense that, had the court reached the merits of the 
infringement claim, labeling the University as the party that is responsible for the 
accident does not seem quite right.  But perhaps the law already contains a 
mechanism to addresses these concerns?  We have yet to consider copyright’s 
famous fair use doctrine.20  This doctrine exempts from liability otherwise infringing 
actions that are found to be fair under a four-factor, case-by-case analysis.  Tellingly, 
the doctrine is sometimes referred to as an “equitable rule of reason.”21  Perhaps, 
therefore, the explicitly equitable focus of the fair use doctrine already serves to 
redress the apparent unfairness of the strict liability rule.  If so, then the University 
would have had nothing to worry about, because had the court ruled on the 
infringement claim, it could have successfully asserted the fair use defense and 
avoided liability.22 
Yet, it is not clear whether the fair use doctrine would indeed come to the rescue 
of the University.  To be sure, commentators have made a forceful argument that the 
OWP, and similar uses of orphan works, constitute fair use, especially when 
undertaken by nonprofit libraries, archives, or educational institutions.23  The case 
for fair use is supported by the broad social benefits to be gained, the very fact the 
work is an orphan, and the small likelihood of adverse market impact when the work 
is not being commercially exploited.  But the argument is not airtight.  Under the first 
fair use factor, it is open to debate whether the works are transformative.  The 
University planned to reproduce and display protected material verbatim; therefore 
the use does not transform the content of the expression.  Although a growing body 
of case law recognizes the transformative nature of uses that copy entire works 
verbatim for innovative purposes such as digital searches and analysis, those cases 
could likely be distinguished here.24  Specifically, one might argue that the use does 
 
 20. 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 21. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448 n.31 (1984). 
 22.  In a separate portion of the case involving a different full-text search database of digitized 
books run by HathiTrust, an organization consisting of several universities including the University of 
Michigan, the court found that the database was fair use.  Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 
97–101 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 23. See, e.g., David R. Hansen, Kathryn Hashimoto, Gwen Hinze, Pamela Samuelson & Jennifer 
M. Urban, Solving the Orphan Works Problem for the United States, 37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 23–24 
(2013). 
 24. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1168 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding 
as fair use the display of thumbnail images of copyright owner’s photographs); Authors Guild, Inc. v. 
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not involve a transformative purpose because the purpose behind the original 
distribution of the books—to entertain and inform through access to the books’ 
content—and the OWP’s purpose are ostensibly the same.  Under the second factor, 
many of the works were fictional and within the core of copyright.  Under the third 
factor, the University was reproducing and planning to display entire works 
verbatim.  And under the fourth factor, one may say that although the works are out 
of print, the use of the works in the OWP will affect the copyright holders’ ability to 
put the works back on the market in the future or obtain licensing fees from the 
University.25  The point is not that the OWP or similar projects necessarily fall 
outside of fair use, but rather that the question of fair use is far from settled. 
B. DE ACOSTA V. BROWN 
De Acosta v. Brown is one of the most well-known cases establishing the principle 
of strict liability for copyright infringement.26  De Acosta wrote a screenplay based 
on the life of Clara Barton, the founder of the American Red Cross, in which she 
included a fictitious romance between Barton and another character.  A year later, 
Beth Brown completed a biography of Barton in which she copied parts of de 
Acosta’s screenplay related to the fictitious romance, including characters, scenes, 
and lines of text unique to the de Acosta screenplay.27  Brown then contracted with 
Hearst Magazines to publish extracts from the forthcoming book.  De Acosta 
successfully sued both Brown and Hearst for copyright infringement.  The court 
found that Hearst infringed innocently; it had neither knowledge of Brown’s copying 
nor any reason to know of it.  Yet, despite their lack of knowledge of the 
infringement, Hearst was just as liable as Brown under copyright’s strict liability 
rule.   
Judge Hand dissented on this point.28  While he accepted copyright’s strict 
liability in general, he argued that a different rule should apply when a person 
unwittingly copies from an intermediary source with no awareness that the source 
contains copied expression.  Particularly, he expressed concern that requiring 
 
Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding as fair use the digital reproduction of 
millions of copyrighted books and the display of “snippets to the public”), aff’d, 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 
2015). 
 25. To be sure, courts have increasingly shown a willingness to find a lack of market harm in cases 
where the copyright holder has not previously commercially exploited the work in the same manner the 
defendant did, prior to the defendant’s use, making the risk of market substitution unlikely.  See, e.g., 
HathiTrust, 755 F.3d at 99–101 (“The full-text search function does not serve as a substitute for the books 
that are being searched.”); Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton 769 F.3d 1232, 1277 (11th Cir. 2014) 
(“[A]bsent evidence to the contrary, if a copyright holder has not made a license available to use a 
particular work in a particular manner, the inference is that the author or publisher did not think that there 
would be enough such use to bother making a license available.  In such a case, there is little damage to 
the publisher’s market when someone makes use of the work in that way without obtaining a license, and 
hence the fourth factor should generally weigh in favor of fair use.”).  But it would certainly be a big step 
to say that verbatim copies of entire copyrighted works do not act as a substitute for the original work. 
 26. 146 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1944). 
 27. Id. at 409–10. 
 28. Id. at 412. 
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publishers to internalize the owner’s harm would be “an appreciable incubus upon 
the freedom of the press” and a “not negligible depressant upon the dissemination of 
knowledge.”29  He concluded that Hearst should not be liable where they had no 
reason to believe the underlying work was copied. 
The facts of De Acosta are illustrative of a common kind of accidental 
infringement in which a defendant obtains permission from one copyright holder to 
reproduce or copy a work that incorporates additional copyrighted works.  As in De 
Acosta, the defendant may not be aware of the copying of the original work at all.  
Alternatively, the defendant may be aware of the copying of the original work but 
erroneously believe a third party’s representation as to the legal status of the work or 
the third party’s right to authorize the use.  Such cases form the classic problem of a 
legal triangle,30 wherein the liability of the party who is directly at fault, having 
caused the legal accident, is not a substantive part of the legal dispute between the 
plaintiff and defendant.31  The law has to decide on whom the harm will fall as 
between two innocents.  In the copyright version of this triangle, those two innocents 
are the owner and the defendant who unwittingly copied by reproducing an original 
copyrighted work contained within the work of a third party.  De Acosta is a case of 
a copyright triangle consisting of a publisher, an author, and a copyright owner.  
While the author is the party at fault, the publisher and the owner are both innocents. 
C. FIELD V. GOOGLE INC. 
Lastly, an example where the accidental infringer was not held liable for copyright 
infringement, Field v. Google Inc., may help to further deepen our understanding of 
the problem.32  As part of the indexing process necessary for its search engine, 
Google produces and stores a cache copy of each indexed website—that is, a copy 
of the website’s HTML code.  Google also offers users access to these cached 
webpages.  In Field, the plaintiff, Blake Field, “decided to manufacture a claim for 
copyright infringement against Google in the hopes of making money from Google’s 
standard practice.”33  Field was aware of Google’s caching practice and that he could 
easily opt out of it by placing into his website’s code a “no archive” meta-tag.34 This 
meta-tag would be recognized by Google and the no archiving request would have 
been honored; the meta-tag was widely known in the website indexing industry as 
signaling a preference not to be cached.  Field placed some short literary works on 
 
 29. Id. at 413. 
 30. See Menachem Mautner, “The Eternal Triangles of the Law”:  Toward a Theory of Priorities 
in Conflicts Involving Remote Parties, 90 MICH. L. REV. 95 (1991). 
 31. See, for example, Nat’l Bank of Com. v. Shaklee Corp., 503 F. Supp. 533 (W.D. Tex. 1980), a 
copyright, unfair competition, and misappropriation of likeness case in which the estate executor for a 
famous newspaper columnist sued a corporation who commissioned and distributed an altered edition of 
a book containing the columnist’s writings that inserted references to the corporations products, even 
though the corporation sought out permission to do so from the book’s various publishers and obtained 
what they believed to be a valid licensing agreement from the publisher for the book printing. 
 32. 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006). 
 33. Id. at 1113. 
 34. Id. 
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his website (entitled, for example, “Good Tea”) and set the permissions in a standard 
file called “robots.txt” to signal that he wanted his website to be crawled and indexed 
by search engines.  Once his website was cached, as Field expected, he sued for 
$2,550,000 in statutory damages, even though Google disabled its users’ access to 
the cached copy of his webpage as soon as it learned of his claim.35   
In Field v. Google, the district court denied Field’s claim.36  The circumstances 
surrounding the case hardly made Field a sympathetic plaintiff.  And the court found 
numerous reasons to reject Field’s case, including findings of implied license, 
estoppel, and fair use.37  The court found that Field’s conscious decision not to attach 
the appropriate meta-tag could be “reasonably interpreted” as the grant of a non-
exclusive license to Google to create cache copies of the protected material.38  
Thereafter, the court found that Field’s claim was estopped because he had “aided 
the defendant in infringing” his own work.39  Field not only knew of Google’s 
conduct but, by failing to add a “no archive” meta-tag and altering the robots.txt file 
to allow indexing, he acted in such a way that Google reasonably believed its actions 
were non-infringing, and Google relied to its detriment on Field’s conduct.40  Lastly, 
the court made a finding of fair use.41 
Although the court was clearly willing to dismiss the claim, the court’s reasoning 
for dismissing the claim is telling.  Consider the court’s finding of fair use.  The court 
relied on a finding that Google’s use of the work was “highly transformative.”42  But, 
as with the OWP case, this finding is hardly beyond debate.  Field’s underlying 
creative works were not altered or changed in any way.  The transformation was in 
Google’s “use” of the work, rather than the content of the work itself.  Cache copies 
allow internet users to access webpages (including, in this instance, the copyrighted 
works) when they are otherwise unavailable.43  Accordingly, the district court found 
that Google’s use (facilitating access) was different than the original purpose of the 
work (serving an aesthetic function).  While this has become an accepted 
interpretation of the transformative use concept,44 it is hardly without its detractors.  
For example, Jane Ginsburg has previously argued that certain uses held by courts to 
be transformative that involve the distribution of a work in its entirety for a socially 
beneficial purpose ought not be considered fair use, but should instead be considered 
a “permitted-but-paid” use, subject to a compulsory licensing regime.45 
 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 1109. 
 37. Id. at 1115–17, 1123. 
 38. Id. at 1115–16. 
 39. Id. at 1116–17. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 1117–23. 
 42. Id. at 1123. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See cases cited supra note 24. 
 45. Jane C. Ginsburg, Fair Use for Free, or Permitted-but-Paid?, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1383, 
1432–46 (2014).  See also R. Anthony Reese, Transformativeness and the Derivative Work Right, 31 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 467, 494 (2008) (explaining the conceptual difficulties with distinguishing 
transformative use from an author’s derivative work right). 
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I am not making the argument that the court’s analysis was wrong or defective; 
there are many arguments that support the court’s conclusion as well.  What I do 
think, however, is that there was something more significant going on in this case.  
Given how the court framed its analysis, I would argue that the case can be read as 
the court recognizing that Field, rather than Google, was the party who was truly 
responsible for the infringement, and that this motivated the judicial findings.  In this 
regard, certain features of the analysis are telling.  In part, the court makes a point of 
emphasizing that Google gave all website operators an easy way to opt out of their 
caching project:  simply attaching the appropriate meta-tag to their website.46  Like 
the copyright owners of the orphan works in the OWP case, if the copyright owner 
in this case had only used this opt-out option, the infringement could have been 
completely avoided.  Furthermore, the court added an additional factor to the 
traditional four-factor fair use analysis:  a fifth factor considering the user’s good 
faith.47  According to the court, the essence of Google’s good faith was the making 
available to copyright owners an easy and accessible means for opting out, and 
honoring the owners’ wishes once they were signaled through this means.48  The 
court’s reasoning can be read as placing significant weight on the fact that Google 
employed a cost-effective precaution to prevent what was clearly a copyright 
accident, and the court believed that these actions by Google cut heavily in favor of 
fair use.  Finally, in ruling in favor of Google’s defense of estoppel, the court 
appealed to equity—the body of law designed to address unfairness in our common 
law rules—to resolve this case.  This is another piece of evidence that suggests the 
court was motivated by a sense that there was something unfair in holding Google 
liable in Field, and may even suggest that the court recognized an unfairness in the 
underlying liability architecture of copyright law.   
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
These highlighted cases leave us with the sense that something is not quite right 
in copyright law.  Of course, in many other cases of infringement, these problems 
are avoided:  In many run-of-the-mill copyright cases, a user will have behaved with 
some element of fault (for example, by intentionally copying a work in circumstances 
where they know they ought not to), and thus, even though they are held strictly 
liable, that strict liability does not seem seriously problematic.  But in cases of true 
innocent infringement, strict liability does invite questions.  This sense of moral 
unease can be found in the existing literature on copyright’s liability regime.  Starting 
in the mid-twentieth century, copyright scholars started to question copyright’s 
liability rule. 
Early alarm bells rang in an unsigned comment in the Fordham Law Review, 
Innocent Participants in Copyright Infringement.49  The comment noted that “scant 
 
 46. Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1122–23. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Comment, Innocent Participants in Copyright Infringement, 8 FORDHAM L. REV. 400 (1939). 
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attention” had been paid to the issue of innocent infringers.50  Like Judge Learned 
Hand a decade earlier, the author found that the strict liability standard generally 
could be defended because of copyright’s clear notice requirements.  In order to 
prevent the statute from becoming “harsh beyond measure,” the author wrote, 
“protection to the public is afforded by the strict requirement that notice of copyright 
. . . be affixed to each copy of the work published or offered for sale in the United 
States” (for example, by attaching copyright information and the famous © symbol 
to the first page of a book).51  But, in a prescient move, the comment raised concerns 
about those who unwittingly copied a work from an intermediary source.52  The 
author highlighted that new technologies, particularly radio and film, often involved 
multiple individuals working closely to produce the final product.  As technologies 
become more complex, this could lead to a common problem where one individual 
copies a work, and then another individual later on in the production chain produces 
copies of the copy, or distributes the copy further, and thus infringes the underlying 
copyright without any knowledge of (or reasonable means of discovering) the 
original infringement.  Indeed, this was the situation that later transpired in De Acosta 
v. Brown.53  But, despite the author’s conclusion that strict liability was “harsh,” that 
normative claim was not unpacked in any significant way in the comment. 
The next major installment in the academic history of strict liability came in 1970.  
Kent Sinclair, Jr., a student at Berkeley, wrote a prize-winning comment arguing that, 
due to the “inequity,” the “harshness,” and the “unfairness” of strict liability, courts 
had developed a rather arbitrary set of rules for limiting damages in inadvertent 
infringement cases.54  But, much like the earlier comment, there was no philosophical 
reflection on why the strict liability standard results in “inequity.”  Of course, the 
article does consider, and rebut, a range of reasons one might defend the strict 
liability rule.55  But this reflection is based primarily on policy rather than on 
principle.  Sinclair considers, for example, the argument that “innocence is easy for 
the defendant to allege and difficult for the plaintiff to disprove,” but dismisses it on 
the ground that criminal law seems to “function satisfactorily” on the basis of 
presumed innocence and that the problem could be solved by placing the burden of 
proving innocence on the defendant.56  Sinclair does not, however, provide much 
clarity on why the liability rule seems “harsh” in the first place. 
Since Sinclair’s comment, much attention has focused on the strict liability 
standard, but not much of it from a moralistic point of view.57  R. Anthony Reese has 
 
 50. Id. at 400. 
 51. Id. at 401. 
 52. Id. at 405–06. 
 53. 146 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1944). 
 54. Kent Sinclair, Jr., Comment, Liability for Copyright Infringement—Handling Innocence in a 
Strict-Liability Context, 58 CAL. L. REV. 940, 940, 945, 980 (1970). 
 55. Id. at 949–54. 
 56. Id. at 950–51. 
 57. An article was published recently that may end up starting the discussion on morality and 
accidental infringement.  See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Restructuring Copyright 
Infringement, 98 TEX. L. REV. 679 (2020).  But apart from a few sentences in the introduction (for 
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explored the historical origins of the strict liability standard.58  In particular, he has 
described how Anglo-American copyright law traditionally adopted a range of 
measures that prevented individuals from innocently infringing copyright—in 
particular, mandatory registration and notice provisions made it easier for the public 
to discover existing legal rights to creative works and thereby avoid infringement.59  
Furthermore, in some copyright infringement actions (such as cases involving 
copying by derivation), courts in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries often did 
consider the defendant’s mental state before imposing liability.60  Moving beyond 
this historical analysis, two scholars have performed conceptual analyses and 
questioned whether copyright really is a strict liability tort.61  Furthermore, in 
addition to introducing the “copyright accidents” concept, Bracha and I have 
performed an economic analysis of such infringements and argued that strict liability 
sets suboptimal incentives for copyright owners to take care to prevent accidents.62  
Finally, various articles have questioned the justifications for strict liability in 
copyright, and considered absolving the defendant of liability when said defendant 
did not intend the infringement.63  These analyses rarely consider the role that 
negligence traditionally plays in the law’s treatment of accidents.  More importantly 
for our purposes, these analyses adopt a “multi-policy” analysis, examining the strict 
liability standard from a number of perspectives, but do not focus specifically on the 
moral philosophy of responsibility.  We now turn to such an analysis in Part II. 
II. MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AND COPYRIGHT INFRINGMENT 
Under what conditions are we morally responsible for a given outcome?  While 
there is clearly no consensus on this (admittedly bluntly framed) question, there are 
nevertheless a range of possible answers.  It might be that we are responsible if we 
were “to blame” for the outcome.  Instead, moral responsibility might lie if we were 
the “cause” of the outcome.  Finally, it could be the case that we are responsible if 
the outcome was otherwise within our “control.”  In this Part, I examine the copyright 
accident cases identified in Part I in light of these three potential bases of moral 
responsibility.  My tentative claim is that all three of these potential bases are relevant 
factors to assess when considering moral responsibility for copyright infringement.  
I argue that the current strict liability regime results in liability for some copyright 
 
example:  “Infringers are liable for damages that bear no proportion to the moral culpability of the 
defendant or, for that matter, to the damages that their behavior actually causes.”  Id. at 682), the article 
largely provides an economic, not moral, analysis. 
 58. Reese, supra note 13. 
 59. Id. at 144–54. 
 60. Id. at 154–75. 
 61. Steven Hetcher, The Immorality of Strict Liability in Copyright, 17 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. 
REV. 1, 2 (2013); Patrick R. Goold, Is Copyright Infringement a Strict Liability Tort?, 30 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 305 (2015). 
 62. Bracha & Goold, supra note 14. 
 63. See, e.g., Dane S. Ciolino & Erin A. Donelon, Questioning Strict Liability in Copyright, 54 
RUTGERS L. REV. 351, 353–54 (2002); Avihay Dorfman & Assaf Jacob, Copyright as Tort, 12 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 59 (2011); Jacqueline D. Lipton, Cyberspace, Exceptionalism, and Innocent 
Copyright Infringement, VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 767, 775–84 (2011). 
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users when they have not acted culpably, when they have not caused the accident, 
and when the accident was outside their control.  Even under an expansive view of 
responsibility, therefore, the strict liability standard does not align with our 
conceptions of fairness.64  Because of these fairness concerns, I ultimately argue that 
copyright should not impose strict liability on defendants in cases of accidental 
infringement. 
A number of caveats are in order before we begin.  First, this Article brackets off 
considerations of causal determinism.  A large philosophical literature addresses 
determinism, and some are of the opinion that our conduct is always caused by some 
prior state of the world.65  In such circumstances our actions are not truly “free” and 
thus we cannot fairly be deemed as responsible for any outcomes.  Addressing such 
concerns is outside the scope of this analysis.  Rather, this Article proceeds on the 
assumption that agents have some capacity to exercise free will and may fairly be 
understood as responsible for outcomes under certain circumstances.  Second, this  
Article also takes as its starting point that intuitions are important.  It assumes that 
the intuitive responses that many would have about the Part I cases deserve reflection 
and examination (and are not merely expressions of ideology).66  Finally, a 
methodological note is required.  The following pages consider the contested grounds 
of moral responsibility.  In cases of conflict, I have chosen to side with the broadest 
reasonable theory of moral responsibility.  The aim is to show that even under a broad 
and expansive understanding of moral responsibility, there is significant moral 
disquiet surrounding copyright law’s strict liability rule. 
A. MORAL CULPABILITY AND BLAMEWORTHINESS 
One of the most common claims in the philosophical literature on moral 
philosophy is that moral responsibility requires that the person’s conduct was, in 
 
 64. The analysis I provide herein is based on the concept of responsibility.  Accordingly, this Article 
does not engage extensively with theoretical ideas and arguments found in the broader literature on strict 
liability and fault liability that are not necessarily relevant to the issue of responsibility.  In particular, this 
Article does not consider in detail the issues of “reciprocity” and risk taking.  For example, George 
Fletcher has argued that one interpretation of tort law is as a regime for imposing liability when individuals 
impose “nonreciprocal” risks on each other.  See generally George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in 
Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972).  Fletcher uses this paradigm to explain why in some instances 
tort law relies on strict liability and at other times relies on negligence liability.  As this Part analyzes the 
issue of whether liability conforms to our intuitions of responsibility, rather than reciprocity, Fletcher’s 
argument is not considered in depth.  Likewise, this Part’s focus on responsibility means that this Part 
does not consider in significant detail arguments that the ideal of corrective justice requires either strict 
liability or negligence liability.  See, e.g., ERNEST WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 145–203 (2d ed. 
2012) (arguing that strict liability is incompatible with the juristic concept of corrective justice that is 
immanent within tort law). 
 65. See generally PIERRE-SIMON LAPLACE, ESSAI PHILOSOPHIQUE SUR LES PROBABILITÉS (1820); 
KARL POPPER, THE OPEN UNIVERSE:  AN ARGUMENT FOR INDETERMINISM (1982). 
 66. See John Rawls, Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics, 60 PHIL. REV. 177, 183 (1951) 
(“An intuitive judgment may be consequent to a thorough inquiry into the facts of the case, and it may 
follow a series of reflections on the possible effects of different decisions, and even the application of a 
common sense rule, e.g., promises ought to be kept.  What is required is that the judgment not be 
determined by a systematic and conscious use of ethical principles.”). 
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some way, “culpable” or “blameworthy.”  Philosophers who take this view argue that 
imposing liability on “innocent” individuals lacks moral foundation.67  There is, 
however, less consensus regarding what counts as blameworthy behavior.  Some 
theorists maintain that an agent only acts culpably if she “intended” to bring about 
the outcome.  Illustrative of this position is R. Jay Wallace’s conclusion that 
responsibility requires a deliberate “choice” to bring about the wrongful outcome.68  
On the other hand, some adopt a more expansive understanding of culpability.  They 
claim that a defendant may be to blame for outcomes flowing from a failure to 
comply with some “standard of conduct.”69  For example, Peter Cane argues that 
“carelessness” or “negligence” may be sufficient to ground moral responsibility.70  
Some conduct (for example, driving) by itself attracts no moral blame, but such 
conduct will become blameworthy if the actor fails to perform the activity at a certain 
standard (for example, sufficient carefulness).  For our purposes, we need not enter 
the substance of this debate.  Consistent with the commitment to adopting an 
expansive view of responsibility, we shall assume for the time being that carelessness 
is a form of moral wrongfulness. 
Under the strict liability standard, copyright law holds liable defendants who have 
not behaved in a blameworthy fashion.  Copyright users are liable for infringements 
they did not intend and, as in the OWP case, where they did not behave carelessly.  
This is true even though damages are, in some cases, reduced on the grounds that 
infringement was not “willful.”71  In such cases, courts continue to hold the defendant 
responsible for the infringement, but decide that a lower level of damages is 
sufficient to correct the wrongful outcome.  The general statement that copyright 
liability does not require culpability is also true despite the fact that courts 
occasionally, as in Field v. Google, do show sensitivity to the presence of reasonable 
care.72  In cases where the defendant acts “innocently,” courts will sometimes take 
this into account in the fair use analysis.  But innocence on its own is never 
dispositive.   
Arguably, copyright infringement necessarily involves some level of culpability.  
This argument may be called the “wrongful copying” argument, and it goes as 
follows:  A copyright owner has a moral right to prevent copying of her work and, 
ergo, any defendant who copies that work without explicit authorization commits a 
moral “wrong”; the defendant is accordingly “to blame” or “culpable” on the grounds 
that she has done something inherently “wrongful.”73  The same argument can be put 
 
 67. See, e.g., EDGAR BODENHEIMER, PHILOSOPHY OF RESPONSIBILITY 9–10 (1980); HART, supra 
note 17, at 225–26. 
 68. R. JAY WALLACE, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MORAL SENTIMENTS 51–75 (1994).  See also J. L. 
MACKIE, ETHICS:  INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG 208–15 (1977). 
 69. See, e.g., PETER CANE, RESPONSIBILITY IN LAW AND MORALITY 78–81 (2002). 
 70. Id. at 65–112. 
 71. 17 U.S.C. § 504. 
 72. See Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1122–23 (D. Nev. 2006). 
 73. To be sure, no one has made this argument exactly, although some have come close.  For 
example, I have previously argued that in order to infringe copyright there must be legal wrongdoing, and 
thus, on some accounts, liability for copyright infringement may not be truly “strict.”  Goold, supra note 
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in a slightly different way.  One may say that morality requires us all to live up to a 
certain standard; we are directed by morality to “not infringe someone’s copyright,” 
and we must try to achieve that standard.  A defendant who fails to achieve this 
standard of conduct behaves culpably by failing to achieve that standard of 
conduct—much like they would in a negligence case.  If such argument is accepted, 
then moral responsibility can fairly be grounded in the copyright user’s wrongful 
conduct. 
I reject the “wrongful copying” argument on the grounds that it confuses two 
distinct concepts:  wrongfulness and culpability.  To say that conduct was “wrongful” 
is to say something about the outcome of the defendant’s conduct.  Conduct which is 
wrongful is in breach of someone else’s rights.  Of course, wrongfulness is not 
synonymous with harm or loss.  One may harm another without doing wrong to that 
person (for example, there is no wrongdoing in causing someone else a purely 
economic loss).  Conduct only becomes wrongful when one injures the legitimate 
rights of others.  Culpability, however, assumes that the outcome was wrongful, and 
questions the process through which the wrongful outcome was brought about:  Was 
the defendant “to blame” for bringing about the wrongful outcome?  If we consider 
doctrinal tort law, nearly all (if not all) torts involve wrongfulness,74 but not all torts 
require culpability.75  Trespass on land, for example, requires a wrong (a breach of 
someone else’s rights), but there are circumstances in which the defendant has done 
so without culpability, and trespass law does not typically require courts to assess a 
defendant’s culpability before a defendant will be found liable for trespass.  The same 
is true in copyright law.  Another way of framing this point, favored by Peter Cane, 
is to make a distinction between “conduct” and “standard of conduct.”76  In some 
cases, trespassing on another’s land or infringing another’s copyright may be morally 
wrongful conduct, but that tells us nothing about whether the defendant conducted 
herself in accordance with a qualitative standard, such as how carefully the defendant 
conducted herself.77 
Moreover, current copyright liability holds copyright users liable not only when 
they have behaved innocently, but when other parties have behaved in a more clearly 
blameworthy fashion.  The OWP case and Field, for instance, demonstrate how 
 
61.  See also Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Obligatory Structure of Copyright Law:  Unbundling the 
Wrong of Copying, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1664 (2012) (discussing copyright infringement as a legal wrong).  
This flows from a view in tort law that some “strict liability wrongs,” such as trespass to land, still involve 
wrongdoing.  See JOHN C. P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, RECOGNIZING WRONGS 189–98 
(2020).  I would argue that it is a short step from these arguments to the argument that the copyright user 
has behaved in a morally wrongful fashion. 
 74. GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 73, at 189 (“Tort law hinges liability on wrongful injury.”). 
 75. Indeed, one may go further and argue that criminal law also requires wrongfulness but not 
necessarily culpability, although more frequently in criminal law both are required. 
 76. CANE, supra note 69, at 82–83. 
 77. I have in this Section made a distinction between wrongfulness and culpability.  But this 
argument leads to a further question:  Can wrongfulness in the absence of culpability be sufficient to 
ground moral responsibility?  I consider this question in the next Section on causation.  I interpret this 
question as:  If someone causes a wrongful outcome, can they be considered responsible on this ground 
alone?  If so, this does, to an extent, equate “wrongfulness,” “wrongdoing,” and “causing a wrongful 
outcome.” 
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copyright owners are frequently culpable—at least in part—in bringing about the 
infringement.  Field intentionally left out the relevant meta-tags which would have 
prevented the injury.  Similarly, if we assume that some of the copyright owners in 
the OWP case learned of the call for information but did not take the reasonable 
measure of responding to the University’s call for information, those copyright 
owners acted in an arguably careless manner.  I would argue that the copyright user’s 
failure to take reasonable care measures is a form of moral culpability, in which case, 
a copyright owner’s failure to do the same carries equal blame.  Furthermore, the 
Part I cases demonstrate not only that copyright owners may be rightly “to blame” 
for the accident, but also that in some instances, intermediaries are more 
blameworthy than either the copyright owner or the copyright user.  In De Acosta, 
for example, Beth Brown clearly copied Barton’s work, thus infringing her 
copyright.78 
Some (particularly proponents of strong copyright protections) may be aghast at 
my suggestion that the copyright owners in the OWP case acted carelessly and thus 
would be appropriately subject to some level of moral blame for the accident, had 
the University gone through with the project.  As these proponents argue, surely it is 
the moral duty of the copyright user to secure consent from the owner ex ante, rather 
than for copyright owners to hawkishly monitor uses of their works.79  To give an 
analogy, if someone at the University of Michigan posts online that they intend to 
come to my house to raid my refrigerator in two weeks, and that my silence would 
be interpreted as consent, would it be “careless” of me not to respond?  The problem 
seems particularly acute when one considers that I may have no connection to the 
hungry University employee and no reason to actively search the internet for such 
posts. 
I disagree that copyright owners are under no moral duty to prevent accidental 
infringement.  The whole premise of contributory negligence is that, in some 
circumstances, we are to blame for our own misfortune.  For example, I have a right 
to physical integrity:  You cannot touch me or physically interfere with me without 
my consent.  Nevertheless, if I drive well above the speed limit, and we collide in a 
road traffic accident which causes me bodily harm, I will rightly be deemed culpable 
for not taking sufficient care to prevent my own injury.80  Naturally, that does not 
mean we must adopt self-protective measures no matter how onerous they may be.  
But we must behave as reasonable people in preventing accidental injury to both 
others and ourselves.  In the case of the hungry University employee above, I clearly 
am under no duty to respond to the employee’s online post.  However, not only is 
that case not an accident case (the employee knows who owns the refrigerator and is 
 
 78. De Acosta v. Brown, 146 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1944). 
 79. Although not making a moralistic point per se, Richard Epstein does suggest that the structure 
of copyright is antithetical to requiring copyright owners to take positive steps to prevent infringement.  
Richard A. Epstein, What Light if Any Does the Google Print Dispute Shed on Intellectual Property Law?, 
7 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 5–10 (2006).  See also generally Oren Bracha, Standing Copyright Law 
on Its Head?  The Googlization of Everything and the Many Faces of Property, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1799 
(2007) (arguing that there is nothing in the essence of copyright that prevents the use of opt-outs). 
 80. See, e.g., Baxter v. Bryan, 122 Ga. App. 817 (Ga. Ct. App. 1970).  See also Froom v. Butcher 
[1976] 1 QB 286 (UK) (involving seatbelt use).   
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in a position to bargain ex ante), but asking me to prevent such injury would go 
beyond the bounds of reasonable care.  Compare that to an alternative hypothetical.  
Imagine the employee finds a refrigerator full of food somewhere.  The refrigerator 
has been left plugged in, and the food is all edible, but there is no ownership 
information attached to the machine or its contents.  Although the employee may 
surmise that the refrigerator was, at some time, owned, it is not clear whether it is 
still owned (or alternatively abandoned), who owns it (if owned), and what that 
owner’s preferences are with relation to the food.  Being a good moral agent, the 
employee searches to find out who, if anyone, owns the food, but finds no answer.  
He then posts online that he will redistribute the food to needy people in two weeks, 
unless the owner comes forward, and makes sure that post is available in places that 
a reasonably attentive owner is likely to find it.  If two weeks go by, and I, the owner, 
have not responded, then, in my mind, I have lost the right to complain about his 
actions.  I have not taken sufficient care to prevent my own injury and am accordingly 
contributorily negligent.  Likewise, the copyright owners in the OWP case have, in 
my mind, not lived up to the standard of reasonable care that we expect of them. 
I would argue that the fact that copyright holds users liable in cases where they 
have behaved innocently, while other parties have behaved culpably, may be at the 
root of our concerns about moral responsibility in copyright.  However, this 
observation alone does not support the claim that copyright law imposes liability on 
users who are not morally responsible for the infringement.  Although it is common 
for philosophers to argue that responsibility requires culpability, this is a contested 
claim.  Others argue that we can be morally responsible for outcomes even when we 
have not behaved culpably.  These philosophers tend to defend strict liability in law 
as consistent with morality.  Illustrative of this position is Tony Honoré’s famous 
concept of “outcome responsibility.”81  Honoré argues that, under certain 
circumstances, we are responsible for outcomes that we brought about with no 
intentionality or negligence.82  We shall return to the substance of this argument later.  
But for now, it is clear that in our investigation of copyright’s liability regime, 
causing copyright infringement is a potentially sufficient grounds for moral 
responsibility, and that this may provide a defense of copyright’s strict liability 
regime. 
B. CAUSATION AND ITS ROLE IN DETERMINING MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 
Some ascribe to the view that we are morally responsible for any outcomes that 
we cause.  But, once again, this position is contested.  For example, Judith Jarvis 
Thomson contends that holding an individual responsible for outcomes they did not 
cause would be an intolerable encroachment upon our freedom of action, and thus 
 
 81. Tony Honoré, Responsibility and Luck:  The Moral Basis of Strict Liability, 104 L. Q. REV. 530 
(1988). 
 82. Id. 
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causation is a necessary requirement of responsibility.83  John Fischer and Robert 
Ennis argue that an individual cannot be held responsible for all of the outcomes she 
“causes” because whether her conduct “causes” the proscribed outcome is often a 
matter of luck (a topic we shall return to in Section C).84  In legal circles, some have 
gone further and denied the very possibility that causation, absent a normative notion 
such as culpability, can generate clear answers to the question of who is responsible 
for a given outcome.85  Translating this debate into the world of copyright accidents 
further demonstrates that strict liability holds copyright users liable even in the 
absence of responsibility.  The problem is that both copyright owners and copyright 
users can take measures to prevent copyright accidents.  As a result, both could 
plausibly be considered “the cause” of the accident.  
Copyright law holds defendants liable if they were a cause of the copyright 
accident.  In order to infringe copyright, one must act in a way that violates a 
copyright holder’s exclusive rights; for example, by copying a protected work.86  
Clearly, copying is what lawyers would label a “but-for” cause of the infringement:87  
But for the University of Michigan’s digitizing of the works, the copyright accidents 
would not have occurred.  Thus under the current copyright laws, the defendant will 
be liable only if she was a cause of the copyright infringement.  This much is simple 
and straightforward. 
However, are the actions of other parties not also but-for causes of copyright 
accidents?  The nature of but-for causation means that several acts can 
simultaneously be but-for causes of a single outcome.  For example, though it is not 
clear from the court’s opinion, it’s possible that some of the copyright owners in the 
OWP case failed to respond to the University of Michigan’s request for information 
after learning of the University’s request.  Had they responded to the request, the 
University would not have planned to publicly distribute a copy of their work as part 
of the Orphan Works Project.  But for the owner’s carelessness, the copyright 
accident would not occur.  Of course, a cynic may argue that the University 
potentially would have publicly distributed the works regardless of the owner’s 
actions.  Indeed, it is true that it is certainly possible that the University would have 
publicly distributed the works contrary to any express wishes of the copyright 
owners.  However, this seems unlikely.  The but-for analysis requires lawyers and 
philosophers to speculate what would happen in the hypothetical case that the 
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 84. John Martin Fischer & Robert H. Ennis, Causation and Liability, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 33 
(1986). 
 85. See Stephen R. Perry, The Impossibility of General Strict Liability, 1 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 147 
(1988). 
 86. See 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
 87. See, e.g., Barnett v. Chelsea & Kensington Hosp. Mgmt. [1968] 2 WLR 422 (UK).  For our 
purposes, we need not consider competitors to the famous but-for test, such as the NESS Test (necessary 
element of sufficient set); it is clear that copying is a factual cause of the outcome without recourse to 
alternative tests, such as would be necessary in cases of overdeterminism.  See H.L.A. HART & TONY 
HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (1985); Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 
1735 (1985). 
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individual in question behaved differently; and in this case, had the copyright owners 
used the opt-out option provided to them, it is likely that the University would not 
have pressed ahead with publicly distributing those claimed works without first 
obtaining a license from the owner.  Even more demonstrative of this point is Field, 
where, had the copyright owner attached the appropriate meta-tag, Google 
automatically and without further human intervention would not have cached his 
works.  In these cases, it seems that the copyright owners were just as “causally 
responsible” as the copyright users. 
More generally, what these cases point to is the acknowledgement that copyright 
owners have significant measures available which, if adopted, can help to avoid 
copyright accidents.  Copyright owners can register their works with the Copyright 
Office, thus making it easier for users like the University of Michigan to prevent 
accidental infringement.88  Similarly, copyright owners can attach notice to the work, 
including the © symbol, as well as other information about the date of the work’s 
creation and ownership status (thus enabling users to identify when the work falls 
into the public domain).89  Likewise, recordation of copyright assignments and 
exclusive licenses can be kept and made available to others to help users identify 
potential right holders.90  In cases such as mass digitization projects, users of 
potentially copyrighted works often give owners an easy, well-publicized, and cheap 
opportunity for opting out from a particular use of their works.91  Owners can take 
advantage of this opportunity and remove the informational fog shrouding their work 
and preferences.92  Owners also often have available preventive means in cases 
where works are copied by derivation from a third party who has illegally 
incorporated the protected work into his own work or misrepresented his rights in 
regard to the protected work.  In such cases, owners have the potential to move 
expeditiously and effectively against the third party, thereby removing the hazard 
created by the third party for accidental infringement by others.93  I would argue that, 
in appropriate cases, owners can effectively “spread the word” about such hazards 
created by illegal or misrepresenting uses of their works.94  The variations are many 
and the list could be extended, but the principle should be clear:  By failing to take 
 
 88. See Registration Portal, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., https://perma.cc/VVY3-42WW (last visited 
Oct. 28, 2020). 
 89. And although such notice is not required to obtain protection, the Copyright Act does regulate 
the form that such notice should take.  17 U.S.C. § 401. 
 90. This can be accomplished with the Copyright Office.  See Recordation of Transfers and Other 
Documents, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., https://perma.cc/4YNB-YNR8 (last visited Oct. 28, 2020). 
 91. See Bracha, supra note 79, at 1817–35. 
 92. To the extent that copyright owners wish to enable use of their work, they can signal these 
preferences through use of open licensing regimes such as Creative Commons licenses.  See About the 
Licenses, CREATIVE COMMONS, https://perma.cc/H8TE-HZ8B (last visited Mar. 23, 2016). 
 93. Such as quickly bringing a copyright infringement suit against Brown prior to Hearst’s 
involvement in De Acosta v. Brown, 146 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1944). 
 94. An interesting example of which comes from the world of patent law.  When George Selden 
believed that his patent on automobile engines was being infringed by Henry Ford’s Model T car, Selden 
launched a campaign telling customers that if they were to buy Ford’s car, then they would also “buy a 
lawsuit.”  See JAMES J. FLINK, THE AUTOMOBILE AGE 51–55 (1988). 
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reasonable action to prevent the accident, copyright owners are equally but-for 
causes of copyright accidents.95 
One might, at this point, attempt to distinguish the position of the copyright user 
and the copyright owner by appealing to the “acts versus omissions” dichotomy (or 
the “misfeasance versus nonfeasance” dichotomy).96  Some, for example, would 
argue that, should an individual pass a drowning man and fail to provide assistance, 
they are not the cause of the man’s death.97  Similarly, one might argue that unlike 
the copyright user, who has undertaken some positive action and affirmative conduct 
(copying), the owners in the OWP case and Field have merely failed to take action 
that could have prevented the infringement.  Some authors in the OWP case 
potentially noticed the call for information and failed to contact the University in a 
timely fashion, and likewise, Field simply failed to attach the appropriate meta-tag 
to his website.  Is the copyright user more fairly considered the “cause” of the 
accident than the owner on the grounds that they have brought about the accident 
through action rather than inaction?  More broadly, is a copyright owner who fails to 
register her work, attach appropriate notice, and record transfers any less of a cause 
of a copyright accident? 
I find the “omissions argument” unpersuasive as applied to copyright 
infringement.  As a general matter, the omissions doctrine is highly contentious, to 
the point that several scholars think the distinction cannot be maintained.98  But even 
if we take a less skeptical stance, it is clear that in some cases, our moral intuitions 
do suggest that individuals can be responsible for outcomes flowing from omissions.  
If a parent does not feed their child, many of us would say the parent is responsible 
for causing the child’s death.99  Tort law is accordingly riddled with exceptions to 
the omissions doctrine where responsibility is attached to inaction (for example, on 
the grounds that the defendant assumed responsibility or created a special source of 
danger).100  Much like these other cases in tort law, my moral sense is that the 
behavior of Field, and the possible behavior of some copyright owners in the OWP 
case, are “causes” of the accident.  Why do I have this sense?  I think, in large part, 
 
 95. For a similar exploration of this idea in patent law, see Dmitry Karshtedt, Causal Responsibility 
and Patent Infringement, 70 VAND. L. REV. 565 (2017). 
 96. See generally RANDOLPH CLARKE, OMISSIONS:  AGENCY, METAPHYSICS, AND 
RESPONSIBILITY (2014). 
 97. See, e.g., Arthur Ripstein, Three Duties To Rescue:  Moral, Civil, and Criminal, 19 L. & PHIL. 
751 (2000) (suggesting a morally intuitive case against the duty to rescue). 
 98. See, e.g., Robinson v. Chief Constable of W. Yorkshire Police [2018] UKSC 4, [2018] AC 736 
(UK) (Lord Reed finding the distinction to be fundamental to the law of negligence; Lord Mance and Lord 
Hughes expressing doubt on the reality of the distinction). 
 99. To be sure, it is important to acknowledge that careless copyright owners who, through inaction, 
cause accidental infringements of their work are not responsible for a result on the same order of 
magnitude as the death of a child  Admittedly, some critics to this argument would say that inaction that 
results in death of a dependent child who one has a duty to care for is not comparable to inaction that leads 
to infringement.  Nevertheless, this example helps illustrate the principle that most of us would say, at 
least in some instances, that a person’s inaction can make them the responsible party for a result. 
 100. See Bourhill v. Young [1942] UKHL 5, [1943] AC 92 (appeal taken from Scot.) (example of 
assumed responsibility); Haynes v. Harwood [1935] 1 KB 146 (UK) (example of special source of 
danger). 
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it is because the copyright owners not only have chosen to produce the works, but 
have actively sought to enforce copyright in the works for their own economic 
benefit.  The copyright owners seem to have made positive steps to bring about 
economic gain from copyright, and in doing so, I would argue that they undertake 
certain moral responsibilities, one of which is to take reasonable care to prevent 
accidental infringements of their work.  Most importantly, the conditions of 
benefiting from copyright require them to mitigate the chance that others will 
accidentally infringe upon their rights.  Failure to take such other preventative steps, 
as in Field, is accordingly a cause of the ultimate accident. 
At this point, we find ourselves in a familiar position for tort lawyers and 
philosophers:  The conduct of several actors seems to be the cause of the ultimate 
wrongful outcome.  The actions of copyright users and copyright owners in accident 
cases may potentially satisfy the but-for test.  Under such circumstances, how are we 
to decide who is morally responsible for the outcome?  Are they equally responsible?  
Or is there a way of breaking the deadlock? 
In response to this question, many philosophers would give up on the causal 
inquiry.  “Causal minimalists”—who are particularly associated with Legal Realism 
within legal philosophy101—would argue that that both copyright owners and 
copyright users are causes of the accident because they both pass the but-for test.102  
Under a causal minimalist framework, if we are to decide that one party bears greater 
responsibility for the accident, then we must do so on some grounds other than 
causation principles.  In particular, many minimalists would argue that we must do 
so on more explicitly normative grounds.  A simple inquiry into causation cannot 
attribute responsibility accurately, and thus, under a minimalist view, we must use 
some alternative moral criterion.103 
If we go down the causal minimalist route, then the argument that copyright users 
are not responsible for the Part I infringements becomes even stronger.  We have 
already examined the leading normative criterion for allocating responsibility:  
culpability.  In essence, if we follow the causal minimalist argument, we give up on 
the possibility of causation providing a reliable indicator of responsibility, and we 
fall back on the conclusions of the preceding Section A—that strict liability is unfair 
because it imposes liability on a party who should not be held responsible for the 
accident because they were not “to blame” for the accident.  If we give up on 
causation as a possible grounds for responsibility, then, in the Part I cases, copyright 
 
 101. See, e.g., Leon Green, Are There Dependable Rules of Causation?, 77 U. PA. L. REV. 601 
(1929) (discussing causation from a Legal Realist perspective).  This view is heavily found in the 
economically influenced views of tort law.  See, e.g., R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & 
ECON. 1 (1960) (arguing that causation is “reciprocal”). 
 102. See, e.g., Peter Godfrey-Smith, Causal Pluralism, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CAUSATION 
326, 333–34 (Helen Beebee, Christopher Hitchcock & Peter Menzies eds., 2009). 
 103. See Perry, supra note 85.  One may also ask:  Could a causal minimalist at this point simply 
decide that both copyright owners and copyright users are equally responsible for the infringement, on the 
ground that they both are but-for causes?  This, however, is unlikely to be the causal minimalist response.  
As minimalists acknowledge, there are often many hundreds of but-for causes, not all of whom we would 
consider responsible for the outcome.  Thus, it falls to minimalists to develop an alternative way to allocate 
responsibility as a matter of necessity. 
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owners are fairly understood as the responsible party, either because of their active 
intentions to bring about the accident or because of their carelessness. 
Of course, lawyers, for the most part, do not ascribe to the causal minimalist 
position.  In tort law, where there are multiple but-for causes of an accident, lawyers 
proceed to ask which of these possible causes was the “proximate” cause (or the 
“legal cause”).104  For the most part, this analysis is not considered a normative 
inquiry, and it is kept distinct from the normative analysis of culpability and 
blameworthiness, which is found in the breach of duty analysis.  Instead, it is an 
inquiry as to which actor’s conduct was, in some sense, “closer” to the ultimate 
outcome.  When considering whose conduct was a proximate cause, courts consult a 
range of factors, the most important being whether the outcome was a “foreseeable” 
cause of the conduct (or more specifically whether the particular harm was a 
foreseeable “type” or “kind” of consequence of the conduct).105  Famously, H.L.A. 
Hart and Tony Honoré argued that this analysis is consistent with how people 
ordinarily think about causation (as evidenced by the fact that such legal principles 
are consistent with “ordinary language”), rather than being a normative inquiry in 
disguise.106  Of course, however, the success of the Hart and Honoré’s project 
remains disputed, particularly in North America.107 
If we discount the causal minimalist argument for the time being, and assume that 
causation principles can be applied without recourse to normativity, then who is the 
proximate cause of the copyright accidents in Part I?  My intuition is that, in some 
cases, the copyright user cannot be considered the proximate cause.  This is 
particularly demonstrated by Field.  In this case, copyright infringement was not only 
a “foreseeable” consequence of Field’s actions, but it was almost a certainty!  It is 
true that copyright infringement is also a foreseeable consequence of Google’s 
caching (indeed, this is why the meta-tag option to opt out of Google’s caching 
exists).  But if we are required to choose between the party who tried to bring about 
the infringement, and the party who tried to stop it, my intuition is that the former is 
more proximate to the ultimate outcome.  I admit, my intuitions are not quite as clear 
in the OWP case.  Nevertheless, even in this case, I see no reason to label the 
University of Michigan the proximate cause in preference to the copyright owners—
at least in instances where a copyright owner saw the University’s call for 
information but failed to act.  Accidental copyright infringement was clearly a 
foreseeable consequence of the copyright owner’s actions:  If one fails to respond to 
a request for information about a work designed to prevent infringement, then 
copyright infringement is a clearly the proximate cause. 
 
 104. Although some notable exceptions are Realist-inspired lawyers who do discuss proximate 
causation in openly normative terms.  See W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & 
DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 42, at 273 (5th ed. 1984) (arguing that 
proximate cause is better called “responsible cause”). 
 105. See, e.g., Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng’g Co. (The Wagon Mound No. 
1) [1961] UKPC 2, [1961] AC (PC) 388. 
 106. HART & HONORÉ, supra note 87, at 254–90. 
 107. See, e.g., Wright, supra note 87, at 1745–50 (arguing that the Hart and Honoré analysis is better 
understood as a theory of responsibility rather than causation). 
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In summary, if we assume that individuals can be morally responsible for 
accidents they cause (even when they have not acted culpably), then copyright’s strict 
liability regime still seems unfair.  It seems unfair because the acts of both copyright 
owners and copyright users can potentially cause the copyright infringement.  
Furthermore, in some cases, copyright owners are plausibly more fairly considered 
the “cause” of the accident (either because of their culpability, as the minimalists 
would argue, or because of their proximity, as lawyers might argue).  Copyright 
attaches liability and responsibility regardless of the role that copyright owners may 
play in bringing about the accident.  Nonetheless, there is one potential counter-
argument to this view worth exploring further.  As highlighted at the start of this 
Section, some argue that causation cannot be a guide to responsibility because of the 
role luck plays.  So, to what extent can one be responsible for copyright accidents 
that are beyond one’s control? 
C. DEGREE OF CONTROL 
One might be tempted to argue that the copyright users from Part I should be 
considered responsible for the accidents because they had a sufficient degree of 
“control” over the circumstances leading up to the infringement.108  Google, the 
University of Michigan, and Hearst Magazines all had sufficient capacity to 
understand copyright law.  They all knew (or could reasonably be expected to know) 
that copying a work that was later found to be protected by copyright would expose 
them to copyright liability.  Nevertheless, they each chose to take a risk and copy the 
work regardless.  There was no pressing need for the copyright users to do this.  
Indeed, they could have behaved very differently:  They could have decided not to 
copy the works at all, perhaps (in some instances) finding alternatives in the public 
domain or only copying works for which they first obtained a license. Yet they 
decided to roll the dice—they put their money on red, but it came up black!—and a 
lawsuit resulted.  Is that not sufficient grounds for holding them responsible for the 
ultimate outcome? 
The initial problem with such arguments is that, to a very significant degree, 
whether copyright users commit accidental infringement is a matter outside of their 
control.  In Field, although the court found Google’s caching was fair use, whether 
or not Google cached Field’s website and works in the first place—in other words, 
whether or not the potential for copyright infringement existed—depended very 
significantly on whether Field attached the relevant meta-tag.109  Likewise, whether 
the University of Michigan committed copyright infringement depended 
significantly on the actions of the relevant copyright owners.110  Had the copyright 
owners responded to the University’s call for information, the University most likely 
would not have committed the infringement.  To put the same point another way, the 
copyright owners in these cases also exercise significant control over the probability 
 
 108. See, e.g., JOHN MARTIN FISHER & MARK RAVIZZA, RESPONSIBILITY AND CONTROL:  A 
THEORY OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 14–16 (1998). 
 109. Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006). 
 110. Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014). 
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that a defendant will accidentally infringe their copyright.  Yet, despite the copyright 
owner’s control of the situation, the copyright user is held solely responsible when a 
court finds that infringement has occurred. 
Nevertheless, perhaps the need for a copyright user to have control over the 
situation is exaggerated.  Some would argue that, under certain conditions, we may 
be responsible for outcomes that, due to the influence of luck, are outside of our 
control.  Tony Honoré famously made this claim as part of his theory of “outcome 
responsibility”111 (following the introduction of the moral luck problem into the 
literature by Thomas Nagel and Bernard Williams112).  Consider, for example, a 
driver who has missed a turn in the road and is considering how to rectify the mistake.  
The driver has two options:  either keep going to the next roundabout, or 
alternatively, make a U-turn in the road.113  Honoré argues that if the driver makes a 
U-turn, then she will be responsible for the outcome, regardless of whether that 
outcome is good or bad.  More often than not, the outcome will be good:  The driver 
will complete the U-turn with no bad consequences and get to her destination more 
quickly.  In these cases, the driver benefits from her good fortune.  Every so often, 
however, the driver will experience bad luck:  She will not see a driver coming in the 
other direction, and the maneuver will result in an accident; our driver did not want 
to cause this accident, but in this instance she simply did not spot the oncoming 
traffic.  Honoré claims that because we enjoy the benefit of good luck, we must also 
bear the responsibility of bad luck; we must, in other words, take “the rough with the 
smooth.”114  Likewise, our defendants in Part I have chosen to take a risk.  More 
often than not, their decisions to copy will be to their benefit (Google clearly benefits 
from their activity more often than not).  Should they not also accept responsibility 
in these minority of cases where, to an extent, they infringed copyright as a result of 
bad luck? 
The outcome-responsibility argument, however, faces the same type of problems 
that we covered in Section B on causation.  Namely, both the copyright owner and 
the copyright user have caused the outcome, in a sense, and thus both bear some of 
the responsibility.  A major objection to Honoré’s U-turn example is that while the 
driver has made a calculated bet in taking the U-turn, the same can be said of the 
oncoming motorist.  The motorist has likewise made a series of decisions that have 
led to the accident, for example, to take the car that day rather than public transit, and 
to take this particular route rather than an alternative slower route.  Without 
introducing some additional normative standard, the concept of outcome-
responsibility leads to an indeterminate allocation of responsibility.115  The same is 
true in the copyright cases.  The copyright owners in the Part I cases equally made 
decisions leading to the accident.  The copyright owners in the OWP case did not 
 
 111. Honoré, supra note 81. 
 112. THOMAS NAGEL, Moral Luck, in MORTAL QUESTIONS 24, 24–38 (1979); BERNARD WILLIAMS, 
Moral Luck, in MORAL LUCK:  PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 1973–1980, at 20–39 (1981). 
 113. Honoré, supra note 81, at 539. 
 114. Honoré’s original essay did not include this particular phrase, but it was subsequently adopted 
in TONY HONORÉ, RESPONSIBILITY AND FAULT 9 (1999). 
 115. See Perry, supra note 85, at 488–96. 
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ensure that their claim was appropriately registered with the Copyright Office and 
did not respond to the University’s opt-out scheme, and thus were equally as 
‘outcome-responsible’ as the University for the infringement. 
III. COUNTER-ARGUMENTS 
The previous Part posited that strict liability seems unfair to many because, in 
some cases, it results in copyright users being held liable for accidents for which they 
are not morally responsible.  This Part continues the analysis by considering a range 
of counter-arguments.  It considers and rebuts the following claims:  (a) that strict 
liability is an essential feature of property rights; (b) that whatever unfairness exists 
is easily resolved by a more lenient approach to copyright remedies; and (c) that 
fairness is not a relevant value in copyright law. 
A. COPYRIGHT AS A PROPERTY RIGHT 
When a lawyer questions the strict liability standard in copyright (often at a 
workshop, seminar, or symposia), almost inevitably someone will ask a question to 
the effect of:  “But isn’t copyright a property right?”116  Putting aside the fact that in 
many jurisdictions copyright involves rights of personhood too (such as moral 
rights), this question is interesting, but ambiguous.  On one level, saying “Isn’t 
copyright a property right?” is a non sequitur; certainly copyright’s economic rights 
are understood as property rights, but this says nothing about what the liability 
structure ought to be.  Nevertheless, the argument cannot be simply brushed aside 
with a simple reaffirmation of the positivist distinction between “is” and “ought.”  
Underneath the question lurk two more interesting arguments, which often go 
unarticulated.  The first argument posits that property has an “essence,” that is, a core 
conceptual content without which something cannot rightly be considered 
“property,”117  and that strict liability is a necessary part of that essence.  In this case, 
would changing the strict liability regime in copyright involve an acknowledgement 
that copyright’s economic rights are not property rights?  That may be a desirable 
outcome, but would surely require much more deliberation and justification than I 
have offered thus far in this Article.  By contrast, the second version of the property 
argument does not rely on any “essential” features of property.  Instead, it highlights 
that many of the arguments made in this Article could equally apply to cases of real 
property violations.  For example, the defendant who, without awareness of the legal 
entitlements, trespasses on a property owner’s land equally incurs strict liability, 
although they are equally blameless.  The question is then:  Should real property’s 
strict liability rule also be abandoned?  Or alternatively, is there a meaningful 
 
 116. And, to an extent, it is found in the literature.  See, e.g., Ciolino & Donelon, supra note 63, at 
371–76 (considering and rebutting the argument). 
 117. For example, see the view that property is essentially a “right to things” in J. E. PENNER, THE 
IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 2 (1997).  See also Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. 
L. REV. 1691 (2012). 
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difference between the defendant in a tangible property case and the intangible 
property case? 
I reject the argument that strict liability is an essential feature of property rights.  
Property may or may not have an essence; that is beyond the scope of this Article.  
But the secondary claim that if property does have an essence then strict liability is 
part thereof, I find unpersuasive.  In large part, I come to this conclusion because at 
least some property violations are remedied via negligence liability rules.  For 
example, if I crash into your car on the public highway, then I will only be liable for 
the damage if I behaved negligently; I will not be held responsible for the outcome 
if that was merely an unfortunate product of fate.118  This example suggests strongly 
that if property has any essential features, negligence liability is, under some 
conditions, compatible with those features.119  Of course, at this point, some may 
object.  These objectors might say that this example involves damage of property 
rather than a trespass upon the property, and the distinction is somehow meaningful.  
Yet, I doubt this distinction between damage and trespass is significant.  If anything, 
damaging someone else’s property is a far greater offense, and far more incompatible 
with the essence of property, than a mere trespass.  Surely if any property rights 
required protection via strict liability, it would be cases of damage?  Taking this 
argument further, perhaps some will simply state that cases of damage to property 
ought to be remedied via strict liability, not negligence liability.  I’d argue that the 
burden must fall on the reformer to make the case for change.  There is no great moral 
outrage (to my knowledge) that liability is imposed for accidental property damage 
only when the defendant behaved carelessly.  At root, I think this is because, in cases 
of accidental infringement or violation of property rights, imposing liability only 
when the defendant behaved carelessly is compatible with the idea of property.120  
Or, to put it another way, I think we have, to an extent, already accepted that in some 
cases, strict liability is not required to remedy interference with property rights. 
Nevertheless, by arguing that copyright ought not impose liability strictly in cases 
of accidents, I do not claim that liability for other types of property violations 
necessarily ought to follow suit.  In particular, I am not making the claim that an 
accidental trespasser on real property ought to be held liable only if she behaved 
negligently.  Nor do I rule out that such a reform may be beneficial.121  Nevertheless, 
some of the significant differences between real property and intangible property 
render strict liability plausibly appropriate in the former, but nevertheless 
inappropriate in the latter.  In particular, the issue of “control” is once again 
significant.  Avoiding accidental infringement of real property rights is significantly 
more within a defendant’s control than avoiding accidental infringement of 
 
 118. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 497–99 (AM. L. INST. 1965); DAN B. 
DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 120–25 (2d ed. 2020). 
 119. See Perry, supra note 85, at 151–52 (responding to Epstein, supra note 83; arguing that despite 
Epstein’s conceptual claim, there is no reason property conceptually requires strict liability rather than 
fault liability protection). 
 120. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970). 
 121. See Stewart E. Sterk, Strict Liability and Negligence in Property Theory, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 
2129, 2132–33 (2012) (arguing that negligence liability rules should be used more often in property law). 
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copyright.  If I wish to avoid becoming a trespasser, I must pay attention to a small 
number of property rights that are in my immediate vicinity.  Furthermore, the subject 
matter of that property—the land—has reasonably clear boundaries, marked by 
various physical boundaries, and the ownership status is relatively easy to 
ascertain.122  Should a defendant fail in this relatively simple duty, it does not strike 
me as grossly unfair to hold her strictly liable.  By contrast, avoiding copyright 
accidents is a highly onerous, and increasingly impossible, task.  There is no 
geographic limitation on copyright accidents:  While I can only trespass on the land 
of those immediately around me, I can trespass on the copyrights of people in every 
corner of the world.  Avoiding copyright accidents thus requires me to take into 
account a much broader set of possible right holders.  Furthermore, those right 
holders are often not easily identifiable, and the boundaries of their rights are 
nebulously defined due to the intangible nature of creative works.123  The result is 
that a future defendant in a case similar to Authors Guild v. HathiTrust can take very 
significant levels of precaution, just as the University of Michigan prepared to do, 
and nevertheless still have the potential to become an accidental infringer.  By 
expecting copyright defendants to avoid all copyright accidents, we hold them to an 
impossible standard.  The fact that avoiding accidental trespass upon real property is 
reasonably within the scope of the defendant’s control, in a way that it largely is not 
with respect to copyright, suggests that a defendant is morally responsible for the 
former accident in a way that they are not for the latter.124 
B. CHANGES TO THE REMEDIES AVAILABLE FOR INFRINGEMENT 
A second potential counter-argument is that, even if the strict liability rule is 
unfair, this unfairness can be resolved by changes to the monetary remedies available 
in cases of accidental infringement.125  This solution, to a certain extent, is already 
adopted in many jurisdictions.126  In the United States, for example, if the copyright 
owner elects for statutory damages (as opposed to actual damages), the court can 
reduce the damage award to “a sum of not less than $200” in cases where the infringer 
“was not aware and had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an 
infringement of copyright.”127  This section was added to U.S. copyright law as the 
strict liability standard solidified, to provide some protection to the accidental 
infringer.  Reese’s history demonstrates that, as copyright law removed elements of 
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fault from its liability standard, and as copyright formalities (designed to prevent 
accidental infringement) became less mandatory, the drafters of the Copyright Act 
of 1976 perceived a need to provide some measure of protection to those who 
infringed copyright without awareness.128  The reduction in statutory damages was 
deemed to be “sufficient to protect against unwarranted liability in cases of 
occasional or isolated innocent infringement.”129  Of course, it does not protect such 
an infringer from injunctive relief, awards of actual damages, or disgorgement of 
profits. 
Ultimately, I disagree with the belief that reduction in damages is sufficient to 
resolve the unfairness of the strict liability standard.  By imposing liability on a 
defendant, the court makes a public pronouncement that the defendant is responsible 
for some wrongful outcome.130  As the defendant is responsible, she accordingly has 
a duty to repair the situation.  By reducing the damages available in cases of 
accidental infringement, courts essentially find that the copyright user is responsible 
for the copyright infringement, but, due to mitigating factors, the level of corrective 
measures required is smaller than it otherwise would be.  They may need to pay a 
smaller amount of damages, but they are still the recipient of state censure, and their 
name would still go down in the law reports as a copyright infringer.  This strikes me 
as unfair to the defendants we discussed in Part I.  I would argue that most people 
have an intuitive sense that the copyright users in these cases are not responsible for 
the outcome.  If our intuitions are right, and they bear little moral responsibility for 
the outcome, then what is the basis for holding them liable at all?  This Article argued 
in the previous Part that if the copyright users are not morally responsible for the 
copyright infringement, then courts should absolve them of liability, not hold them 
liable while simply reducing the damage award.  Although not discussed in Part I, 
the “subconscious copying” cases, wherein a musician unknowingly reproduces parts 
of a popular song, are a great example where liability, even with reduced damages, 
seems particularly out of step with our notions of responsibility.131 
C. CONSEQUENTIALISM AND COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT 
A final possible counter-argument is that my concern for fairness in this Article 
is simply misplaced.  Copyright law, particularly in common law jurisdictions, is 
justified on consequentialist grounds.  As the U.S. Constitution says, Congress has 
the power to enact IP rights in order “To promote the Progress of Science and useful 
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Arts.”132  A consequentialist would argue that we judge copyright by whether the 
law leads to good or bad outcomes, not whether it reflects our sense of fairness.  In 
particular, many consequentialists would argue that copyright is justified on the 
economic-utilitarian ground that, in the absence of legal protection, authors would 
underproduce creative works, and the resulting market failure would lead to lower 
social welfare (or preference satisfaction, or perhaps even wealth) in the future.133  If 
this is acknowledged as the primary justification for copyright, then whether 
copyright liability should be strict or not is a question that must be judged according 
to the same social welfare maximization goal.134  This argument can be rephrased in 
less utilitarian terms:  In order to be “coherent,” the liability structure should match 
the underlying normative values of the law.135  Elsewhere, Bracha and I have argued 
that strict liability should give way to negligence liability precisely for 
consequentialist (particularly economic) reasons.136  Nevertheless, putting this aside 
for the moment, does fairness have a place to play in informing the liability standard 
in copyright? 
I think fairness is an appropriate value to consider when judging copyright’s 
liability standard.  For the moment, let us assume that the primary justification for 
copyright is consequentialist.  We have a copyright system because we think it will 
lead to more happiness, a more attractive culture, or even simply a wealthier society.  
It does not follow, however, that other human values, such as our sense of fairness, 
automatically fall away.  In particular, I believe that other human values constrain 
and influence what copyright lawmakers can do in pursuit of good social 
consequences.  One potential illustration of this comes in the form of statutory 
damages.  In the United States, a copyright owner can elect to obtain statutorily 
defined damages rather than actual damages.  If the copyright owner makes such an 
election and the infringement is found to be willful, the court can order the defendant 
to pay damages up to $150,000 per work, even if the actual damage done is quite 
minimal.137  It is plausible that there is sound economic sense to this damage 
provision.  Copyright infringement is hard to detect, and in order to provide an 
adequate deterrence, the level of damages must be punitively high when willful 
infringement is found.138  Such punitive damages may be necessary therefore to 
ensure the copyright system works as a whole.  Nevertheless, even if—a big “if”—
such heightened damages do lead to good consequences as a whole, it can lead to 
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individual cases where the damages seem grossly excessive in proportion to the harm 
committed, and are thus morally unfair to the individual who is forced to pay them.  
In such cases, the individual is forced to pay a supra-compensatory remedy.  They 
are being required to pay money far in excess of that which is needed to correct the 
wrongful outcome for which they are responsible.139  In such a case, I believe fairness 
ought to constrain copyright law, and it generally provides a reason for rejecting 
punitive statutory damages.  While the underlying justification may be 
consequentialist, in a case like this, fairness may need to restrain what we do in the 
name of good consequences.  I think the same is true when it comes to the liability 
standard.  Given this, it’s clear that copyright’s strict liability standard is in need of 
reform.  But what form should this take?  As explained in Part IV, a negligence 
liability rule is one such reform that would lead to good consequences.  But even if 
it did not, fairness alone should make us reconsider the strict liability rule.   
IV. REFORMING COPYRIGHT’S STRICT LIABILITY STANDARD:  
REPLACING STRICT LIABILITY WITH NEGLIGENCE 
Adopting a negligence liability rule in copyright would seem to be appropriate 
from our perspective of fairness.  Under such a rule, a copyright user should not be 
held liable for any infringements for which they had adopted all reasonable care to 
avoid infringement.  In all of the cases identified in Part I, the defendants should have 
been absolved of liability on the ground that they had adopted the care that a 
reasonable person would have taken in order to avoid the accidental infringements. 
In one respect, this proposal is less radical than it could be.  One plausible 
alternative is to argue that copyright users should not be held liable when they do not 
“intend” copyright infringement.140  Indeed, this proposal would seem to be 
consistent with some of the philosophical literature we have come across in this 
Article.141  But such a big reform would push allocation of legal responsibility too 
far in the other direction.  Hypothetically, imagine an alternative situation where the 
University of Michigan found the old works in their library and decided to press 
ahead with releasing digitized copies of these works without adopting any measures 
designed to avoid infringement.  If the copyright holders later came forward and 
sued, the University would be able to claim that, because they were unaware of any 
copyright or copyright holders, they had not intended the infringement and thus are 
not liable.  This outcome does not strike me as significantly fairer than our current 
situation.  In a hypothetical case like this, where the defendant has behaved 
carelessly, I believe the copyright holders are justified in seeking damages.  This 
would be frustrated under a rule that only intentional infringements can result in a 
remedy. 
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But in another respect, the proposal is more generous to the copyright users than 
other conceivable reforms.  For example, rather than adopt a simple negligence rule, 
an alternative solution would be to keep the strict liability rule but adopt a 
contributory negligence defense.142  Under such a rule, the defendant would be liable 
for the infringement unless she could show that the copyright owner behaved 
negligently.  Such a solution would indeed resolve the sense of unfairness present in 
future cases with facts similar to the OWP case and Field, where—unlike the OWP 
case and Field—the court finds the defendants liable for copyright infringement 
despite the accidental nature of the infringement.  In such cases, it is likely that the 
defendants will be able to demonstrate that the copyright owners were at fault for the 
accident, and thus the defendants should avoid liability.  Nevertheless, this would not 
go far enough to remedy the unfairness caused in the copying by derivation cases.  
Let us consider De Acosta again.143  Let us assume that the copyright owner took all 
reasonable steps to avoid the copyright infringement (she appropriately registered 
her work, attached notice, etc.), and on this ground could not be said to be 
contributorily negligent.  Brown then copied the work, and gave the copied work to 
Hearst Magazines for publication (being sure to remove any information which 
would allow Hearst to learn the true source of the material, such as any copyright 
notice).  Let us assume that Hearst adopted due care and tried to confirm that by 
reprinting Brown’s manuscript they were not committing copyright infringement by 
derivation (copying a copy).  But even when exercising due care, Hearst is at a 
substantial disadvantage.  They could of course ask Brown whether the manuscript 
was copied, but it is likely Brown would not be truthful.  Furthermore, even if Hearst 
suspects Brown is being untruthful, there is very little they can do to discover that 
Brown’s work contains copyrighted elements from third-party works.  Hearst had no 
knowledge of what source material Brown had copied, and accordingly, an attempt 
to discover whether that source material was protected by copyright was not feasible.  
In cases like these, where the copyright owner has not behaved negligently, a diligent 
copyright user may ultimately infringe copyright.  Under a strict liability regime that 
includes a contributory negligence defense, a number of copyright users, like Hearst 
in this scenario, will be held liable for copyright infringements for which they are not 
truly responsible. 
Fortunately, in the United States and many other jurisdictions, copyright law 
could be changed to a negligence liability rule in a relatively straightforward manner.  
Bracha and I have previously demonstrated, in detail, how the fair use analysis could 
be modified with somewhat minor tweaks in order to ensure that only defendants 
who behave carelessly will be held liable for accidental infringement of copyright.144  
In non-accident cases, no modifications to the doctrine are required.  Accident cases 
involving uses that are clearly fair even in non-accident circumstances likewise 
require no modification to the analysis.  However, when a court determines that the 
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defendant’s action substantially involved only a risk of infringement and that the 
action would not be clearly fair if the case had been a non-accident case, the fair use 
doctrine must be modified to evaluate whether the defendant’s level of care was less 
than reasonable.  If the defendant failed to take a reasonable precautionary measure, 
then the use will not be fair.  Alternatively, if she did take these precautions—that is, 
if she was not negligent—then the use will be fair.145  As Congress expects courts to 
assess the “purpose and character” of the defendant’s use, the negligence analysis 
could formally fit under this fair use factor.146  However, for analytic clarity, it is 
preferable if courts conceive of the extra negligence inquiry as a separate and 
additional factor as they are authorized to do.147  The result of this is that the burden 
would fall on the copyright user to prove they behaved non-negligently.  But this is 
an acceptable drawback for the convenience of incorporating the negligence analysis 
within the existing fair use doctrine.  Furthermore, because this change does not 
radically disrupt the fair use inquiry, other countries that have a fair use doctrine 
(such as Israel), are equally able to incorporate a negligence standard into their fair 
use laws.148 
We have previously demonstrated how such a modification would be legally and 
politically feasible.149  In particular, courts have, in recent times, shown a willingness 
to adapt the contours of the fair use inquiry to suit various socioeconomic realities 
and normative concerns.  For example, the transformative use criterion only became 
incorporated into fair use law in 1994 following the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.150  Subsequently, this has factor has come to 
dwarf the other fair use factors in several recent court opinions analyzing fair use.151  
This modification was entirely in keeping with Congress’s desire to avoid a rigid, 
inflexible test for fair use and instead allow courts to adapt the doctrine to changing 
conditions.  Perhaps even more significantly, such a modification would serve the 
underlying purpose of the doctrine.  The doctrine is sometimes called an “equitable 
rule of reason” and, even more tellingly, the doctrine is the “fair” use doctrine.152  
The rule has always existed to remedy unnecessary harshness within copyright.  By 
introducing a negligence standard into this doctrine, the modified fair use analysis 
will better live up to the role of ensuring fairness within copyright law. 
Of course, outside the United States and other fair use jurisdictions, adopting a 
negligence liability rule presents unique challenges.  Without a fair use doctrine, the 
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most logical way forward would be to introduce a negligence standard into the prima 
facie copyright infringement analysis.  Currently most jurisdictions require that the 
defendant “copy” a “substantial part” (or language to that effect) of the original 
work.153  If such copying is found, the defendant will be liable unless she can show 
how her use fell within the bounds of a relevant exception.  In these jurisdictions, the 
most likely way to introduce a negligence principle would be introduce a third 
requirement:  carelessness.  A defendant would be liable if she copied a substantial 
part of the work and had not adopted all reasonable care in the circumstances.  Note 
that under such a regime, the burden of proof would not need to be assigned to the 
plaintiff.  It is entirely consistent with the argument of this Article to require a 
copyright owner to prove the defendant copied a substantial part of his work, at which 
point the defendant will be presumed responsible for the infringement unless she can 
rebut that presumption by showing she adopted all reasonable care.  Adopting this 
solution is less preferable than making modifications to the fair use analysis.  Unlike 
the fair use analysis, the copyright infringement analysis in most jurisdictions has 
been relatively stable for many years, and modifications would require arguably 
more upheavals.  Nevertheless, in countries without a fair use analysis, it would seem 
not only the most likely way forward; it is also within the jurisdiction of the courts 
to implement.  In the United Kingdom, as with many other jurisdictions, the relevant 
copyright legislation is silent on the liability standard and can be modified by courts 
without legislative intervention.  A recent example from the European Union is in 
the case GS Media BV v. Sanoma Media Netherlands BV, in which the CJEU found 
that a defendant could not be held liable for “communication to the public” of 
copyrighted works when posting hyperlinks to such content online unless the 
defendant could have reasonably known about the unlawful nature of the online 
content.154  This would be a small step in the right direction. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Copyright’s strict liability rule was created by judges in an era where mandatory 
formalities greatly limited the possibility of accidental infringement.  In the twentieth 
century, those safeguards have been whittled away and, as a result, the accidents 
problem has grown substantially.  Now more than ever, it is easy for copyright users 
to accidentally infringe copyright.  In these cases, the law holds users strictly liable 
for their infringement.  But, as this Article has explored, strict liability has long felt 
harsh and unfair.  This Article has attempted to explore these intuitions surrounding 
strict liability.  I argue that the reason strict liability appears harsh is because it results 
in copyright users being held liable for infringements for which they are not morally 
responsible.  The current liability structure seems to hold users liable when they are 
not really “to blame” for the accident, when they are not “the cause” of the accident, 
and when the accident was largely outside their scope of “control.”  Furthermore, in 
some cases, the current rules hold users liable when other parties, particularly 
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copyright owners or intermediate users, seem to bear greater responsibility for the 
wrong.  If these intuitions are shared by others, then the unfairness could be remedied 
within the United States (and similar jurisdictions) by adopting a negligence factor 
within the fair use analysis.  The fair use doctrine could, in this way, become even 
fairer. 
 
